भारत सरकार Government of India
विद्युत मंत्रालय Ministry of Power
उत्तर पूर्वी क्षेत्रीय विद्युत समिति
North Eastern Regional Power Committee
एन ई आर पी सी कॉम्प्लेक्स, डोंग पारमाओ, लापालाङ, शिल्लोंग-७९३००६, मेघालय
NERPC Complex, Dong Parmaw, Lapalang, Shillong - 793006, Meghalaya

No. NERPC/SE(P)/PCC/2026/1684-1725 Date: 10.09.2026

To
As per list attached

Sub: 91वीं संरक्षण समन्वय उप-समिति (पीसीसी) बैठक का कार्यवृत्त/ Minutes of 91st Protection Coordination Sub-Committee (PCC) Meeting

महोदय/महोदया,

कृपया 20 अगस्त 2026 को NERPC कॉन्फ्रेंस हॉल, शिलांग में हुई 91वीं पीसीसी बैठक के कार्यवृत्त को अपनी जानकारी और आवश्यक कार्रवाई के लिए प्राप्त करें। कार्यवृत्त एनईआरपीसी की वेबसाइट www.nerpc.gov.in पर भी उपलब्ध है।

कृपया कोई भी टिप्पणी जल्द से जल्द NERPC सचिवालय को सूचित करें।

Sir/Madam,

Please find enclosed herewith the minutes of the 91st PCC Meeting held at NERPC Conference Hall, Shillong on 20th August 2026 for your kind information and necessary action. The minutes is also available on the website of NERPC: www.nerpc.gov.in.

Any comments/observations may kindly be communicated to NERPC Secretariat at the earliest.

भवदीय / Yours faithfully,

(वी. एन. मुंचा / V N Muncha)
निदेशक / Director

Encl: As above

Distribution List:

1. Managing Director, AEGCL, Bijuli Bhawan, Guwahati – 781 001
2. Managing Director, APGCL, Bijuli Bhawan, Guwahati – 781 001
3. Managing Director, APDCL, Bijuli Bhawan, Guwahati – 781 001
4. Managing Director, MSPCL, Electricity Complex, Keishampat, Imphal – 795 001
5. Managing Director, MSPDCL, Secure Office Bldg. Complex, South Block, Imphal – 795 001
6. Director (Transmission), MePTCL, Lumjingshai, Short Round Road, Shillong – 793 001
7. Director (Generation), MePGCL, Lumjingshai, Short Round Road, Shillong – 793 001
8. Director (Distribution), MePDCL, Lumjingshai, Short Round Road, Shillong – 793 001
9. Director (Tech.), TSECL, Banamalipur, Agartala -799 001.
10. Director (Generation), TPGCL, Banamalipur, Agartala -799 001.
11. GM (Transmission), TPTL, Banamalipur, Agartala -799 001.
12. Chief Engineer (WE Zone), Department of Power, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar- 791111
13. Chief Engineer (TP&MZ), Department of Power, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar- 791111
14. Chief Engineer (Commercial) -cum- CEI, DoP, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar- 791111
15. Engineer-in-Chief, P&E Department, Govt. of Mizoram, Aizawl – 796 001
16. Engineer-in-Chief, Department of Power, Govt. of Nagaland, Kohima – 797 001
17. ED (O&M), NEEPCO Ltd., Brookland Compound, Lower New Colony, Shillong-793003
18. ED (O&M), NHPC, NHPC Office Complex, Sector-33, Faridabad, Haryana-121003
19. Group GM, NTPC, Bongaigoan Thermal Power Project, P.O. Salakati, Kokrajhar- 783369
20. Vice President (Plant), OTPC, Badarghat Complex, Agartala, Tripura - 799014
21. ED, PGCIL/NERTS, Dongtieh-Lower Nongrah, Lapalang, Shillong -793 006
22. AGM (BD), NVVN, Core 5, 3rd floor, Scope Complex, 7 Institutional Area, Lodhi Rd., N. Delhi-3
23. Vice President, PTCIL, 2nd Floor, NBCC Tower, 15, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi – 110066
24. Dy. COO, CTUIL, "Saudamini", 1st Floor, Plot No. 2, Sector-29, Gurugram, Haryana – 122001
25. Chief Engineer, GM Division, Central Electricity Authority, New Delhi – 110066
26. Chief Engineer, NPC Division, Central Electricity Authority, New Delhi – 110066
27. Head & VP, (R&C), ENICL, IndiGrid, Windsor Building, Kalina, Santacruz (East), Mumbai- 98
28. ED, NERLDC, Dongtieh, Lower Nongrah, Lapalang, Shillong -793 006
29. CGM, AEGCL, Bijuli Bhawan, Guwahati – 781001
30. CGM, APGCL, Bijuli Bhawan, Guwahati – 781001
31. CGM, DISCOM, Bijuli Bhawan, Guwahati – 781001
32. Head of SLDC, Dept. of Power, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar – 791111
33. CGM, (LDC), SLDC Complex, AEGCL, Kahilipara, Guwahati-781 019
34. Head of SLDC, MSPCL, Imphal – 795001
35. Head of SLDC, MePTCL, Lumjingshai, Short Round Road, Shillong – 793 001
36. Head of SLDC, P&E Deptt. Govt. of Mizoram, Aizawl – 796 001
37. Head of SLDC, Dept. of Power, Govt. of Nagaland, Dimapur – 797103
38. Head of SLDC, TSECL, Agartala – 799001
39. Chief Engineer (Elect), Loktak HEP, Vidyut Vihar, Kom Keirap, Manipur- 795124
40. DGM (O&M), OTPC, Badarghat Complex, Agartala, Tripura – 799014
41. AGM Regulatory & Commercial, NER II TL, 10th Floor, Berger Tower, Noida sector 16B-201301
42. Director, NETC, 2C, 3rdFloor, D21Corporate Park, DMRC Building Sector 21, Dwarka, Delhi-77.

(वी. एन. मुंचा / V N Muncha)
निदेशक / Director

सत्यमेव जयते

MINUTES OF

91st PCCM

Govt. of India

Ministry of Power

North Eastern Regional Power Committee

Shillong

North Eastern Regional Power Committee

Minutes of

91st Protection Coordination Sub-Committee Meeting

Date: 20/08/2026 (Thursday)

Time: 11:00 hrs.

Venue: NERPC Conference Hall, Shillong

Member Secretary, NERPC welcomed all the participants to the 91st Protection Coordination Committee Meeting. He expressed concern over the inadequate and delayed submission of Disturbance Recorder and Event Logger data by certain utilities, particularly Assam. He urged the concerned utilities to take necessary actions to ensure timely and 100% submission of data.

He also emphasized the need to adopt new emerging technologies to improve the effectiveness and reliability of protection systems, particularly in view of the limited manpower available for protection-related monitoring and analysis. He further advised to leverage that Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning tools to address the challenges being faced by the protection system.

He, then requested Director (P), NERPC to take up the agenda items.

The list of participants is attached as annexure I

A. CONFIRMATION OF MINUTES

1. CONFIRMATION OF MINUTES OF THE 90th PROTECTION SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING OF NERPC.

Minutes of the 90th PCC Meeting held on 23rd June, 2026 at NERPC Conference Hall, Shillong was circulated vide letter No.: NERPC/SE(P)/PCC/2026/1157-1198

Since, no comments were received from the constituents, the Sub-committee confirmed the minutes of the 90th PCCM.

B. ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION

B.1 Protection Audit of NER:

As per the protection code of IEGC 2023 following roles and responsibilities, related to the subject mentioned, of constituents have been defined–

Description		Constituent	Responsibility	Timeline
Audit	Internal Audit	All users (132kV and above)	Shall conduct internal audit of protection system	Annually
			Audit report to be shared with RPC	Within 30 days of Audit
			Action plan for rectification of deficiencies to be shared with RPC	Within 30 days of Audit
	Third party Audit	All users (132kV and above)	Shall conduct audit for each SS	Once in five years
			Shall conduct audit on advice of RPC	Within three months of advice of RPC
			Audit report to be submitted to RPC and NERLDC/SLDC	Within a month of submission of third-party audit report
			Action plan for rectification of deficiencies	Same as above
		RPC	Compliance to audit reports to be followed up regularly	Not specified
		RPC	After analysis of any event, shall identify substations where audit is required to be carried out	Conditional responsibility
	Annual audit plan	All users	Annual audit plan to be submitted to RPC by ***31st October***	Annual

Status of Internal/External audit (90th PCCM)

Sr No	Utility/ Constituents	Internal Audit		External audit	
		Latest Status	**report**	**Latest Status**	**report**
1.	Ar. Pradesh	(Total Substation: 09) Audits to start October onwards	FY 25-26: Report for Daporijo, Khupi and Tenga shared.	Planning and Tendering will be done for audit of all 9 SS. Proposal has been put up to the government for funding approval. (audit of 3 SS done by NERPC).	NA
2.	Assam	To be done for FY 2026-27. (Total Substation: 82)	All the reports shared for FY 25-26.	Tendering process underway, to be completed by next month. It is planned to conduct audit of 20 substations by next year. Using own funds for the audit	
3.	Manipur	Planning being done for next FY (2026-27). Proposal has been put up to higher authorities (Total Substation: 17)		17 SS to be done, Schedule to be decided, subject to funding approval and law and Order situation. Audit of Yurembam ss, Ningthoukhong SS and Imphal (PG) were done by NERPC in Aug'25. Manipur facing fund issue for 3rd party audit.	NA

4.	Meghalaya	For FY 2026-27, to be planned shortly. (Total Substation: 22)	for FY 25-26 Reports to be finalized this Friday, will submit by end of this month	Audit of 19 substations done, 13 by CPRI and 6 by NERPC.	Reports submitted
5.	Mizoram	Audit of 4 substations done for FY 26-27. Rest of the audits will be taken up shortly. (Total Substation: 13)	Report yet to be shared.	Techno-commercial offer received from PRDC, proposal has been put up to E-in-C. Audit of Kolasib, Aizawl, Melriat (PG), Zuangtui and Luangmual were done by NERPC in October'25.	
6.	Nagaland	10 out of 11 SS done for FY 2025-26, Likimro left. For FY 26-27, a plan has been prepared, audits will start within 2 months.	Reports for 9S/s have been submitted for FY 25-26.	Quotation has been received from 3 firms. One firm has been chosen for conducting the audits. Order will be issued shortly. Timeline will be provided shortly.	
7.	Tripura	For FY 25-26, 16 done, two substations, Manu and Amarpur have been recently commissioned under NERPSIP	Reports shared for FY 25-26	9 done by M/s ERDA.	Pre-liminary report shared, final will be shared shortly

		project and are yet to be handed over to the state. For FY 26-27, audit will be planned shortly. (Total Substation: 18)			
8.	Powergrid (NERTS)	FY 2025-26 completed. For FY 2026-27, audit of 3 substations done.	Report for 16 S/s has been shared for FY 25-26.	Bid floated for audit of 13 substations. To complete the audits within one year. Total 9 SS done by NERPC.	
9.	NTL	Audit of P K Bari and S M Nagar to be done in March'26. (Utility absent)		Feb, March'26. (Utility absent)	
10	KMTL	Done	submitted	Done by M/s ERDA	Report submitted
12	NEEPCO (Total Substation: 10)	For FY 2026-27 Planning underway.	All reports submitted for FY 25-26	External Audit completed for 3 stations (AgBPS, Kameng and Turial) done. Upcoming: Pare-July'26 PLHPS -Sept'26 AGTCCPP – done AGBPS – done Monarchak – Sep'26	Report of Kameng will be submitted as soon as it is provided by M/s PRDC. Other reports will

				Doyang- Sept'26	be shared in due course
16	APGCL	Plan shared		Tendering going on for audit of 3 stations, Namrup, Lakwa and Karbi-Langpi	
17	TPGCL	TSECL will write a letter to TPGCL on the matter		Status will be intimated in next meeting	
18	MEPGCL	All done for FY 25-26. For FY 26-27, to be planned shortly.	All reports shared for FY 25-26	Budgetary offer received from M/s CPRI, M/s CBIP and M/s PRDC. The audits will incur very high financial burden. It was requested to NERPC to conduct the audit of the generating stations. NERPC opined that they may consider conducting the audit of some stations based on criticality.	

NERLDC requested all utilities to update the status of internal and 3rd party protection audit for the FY 2026-27 in the google spreadsheet.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1MB51hUo60dzmOrK179gQE9qPVHjScYe6fikY3u0c47k/edit?gid=0#gid=0

Deliberation

Status of Internal/External audit (91st PCCM)

Sr No	Utility/ Constituents	Internal Audit		External audit	
		Latest Status	**report**	**Latest Status**	**report**
1.	Ar. Pradesh	(Total Substation: 09) Audits to start October onwards	FY 25-26: Report for Daporijo, Khupi and Tenga shared.	Government funding has been approved and floating of tender has been initiated for -7 substations. (audit of 2 SS had done by NERPC).	NA
2.	Assam	To be done for FY 2026-27 October onwards. (Total Substation: 82)	All the reports shared for FY 25-26.	Funds have been allocated and tendering is underway for 20 substations.	
3.	Manipur	Aduit to start in 1 or 2 months (Total Substation: 17)		Protection audit of 15 SS to be done. The Schedule of the same will be finalized subject to funding approval and prevailing law and Order situation. Audit of Yurembam ss, and Ningthoukhong SS were carried out by NERPC in Aug'25. MSPCL informed the forum that it is presently facing financial constraints in engaging an external agency for conducting third-party protection audits.	NA

4.	Meghalaya	For FY 2026-27, to be planned shortly. (Total Substation: 22)	for FY 25-26 Reports to be finalized this Friday, will submit by end of this month	Audit of 19 substations completed, 13 by CPRI and 6 by NERPC.	Reports submitted
5.	Mizoram	5 substations done. (Total Substation: 13)	Report of 4 SS submitted	Awarded to PRDC. Audit to be done before Dec'26	
6.	Nagaland	For FY 26-27, audit completed	Reports submitted	Quotation Were received from 3 firms, following which one firm was selected for carrying out protection audits. The proposal is presently waiting for approval from Finance Department, Gov of Nagaland.	
7.	Tripura	For FY 25-26, 16 done, two substations, Manu and Amarpur have been recently commissioned under NERPSIP project and are yet to be handed over to the state. For FY 26-27, audit will be planned shortly.	Reports shared for FY 25-26	9 done by M/s ERDA.	Pre-liminary report shared, final will be shared shortly

		(Total Substation: 18)			
8.	Powergrid (NERTS)	For FY 2026-27, audit of 6 substations done.	Report for 3 submitted	Bid floated for audit of 13 substations. To complete the audits within one year. Total 9 SS done by NERPC.	
9.	NTL	Audit of P K Bari and S M Nagar to be done in March'26. (Utility absent)		Feb, March'26. (Utility absent)	
10	KMTL	Done	submitted	Done by M/s ERDA	Report submitted
12	NEEPCO (Total Substation: 10)	For FY 2026-27 Planning underway.	All reports submitted for FY 25-26	External Audit completed for 3 stations (AgBPS, Kameng and Tuirial) done. Upcoming: Pare-ordered to PRDC, to be done shortly PLHPS -between October to Dec'26 (lean hydro time) AGTCCPP – done AGBPS – done Monarchak – Sep'26 Doyang- Sept'26 Kopili and Khandong will be done in next FY.	Report of Kameng has been submitted. Report of Turial will be submitted by September' 26.
16	APGCL	Plan shared		Tendering going on for audit of 3 stations, Namrup, Lakwa and Karbi-Langpi The	

				tendering process for conducting protection audits of Namrup, Lakwa and Karbi Langpi generating stations is currently underway.	
17	TPGCL	TSECL updated that they have written a letter to TPGCL but they are not responding			
18	MEPGCL	All done for FY 25-26. For FY 26-27, to be planned shortly.	All reports shared for FY 25-26	Budgetary offer received from M/s CPRI, M/s CBIP and M/s PRDC. Proposal submitted to higher authorities.	

After detailed deliberations, it was decided that –

1. NERLDC and NERPC shall jointly review the internal protection audit reports submitted by the utilities and identify the major deficiencies and recurring shortcomings observed therein.
2. In addition to submitting their Internal Audit and Third-Party Audit Reports, the utilities shall present the key audit observations, identified deficiencies and status of corrective actions.
3. NERLDC shall prepare and maintain a consolidated Excel sheet containing the audit observations, corrective actions proposed by the respective utilities and the latest status of implementation of such corrective actions. The same will be reviewed during PCC meetings or GD meetings.

Forum noted the above

Action: all utilities

B.2 Analysis and Discussion on Grid Disturbances which occurred in NER grid in June and July'26 in compliance with IEGC 2023:

TABLE 8 : REPORT SUBMISSION TIMELINE

Sr. No.	Grid Event^ (Classification)	Flash report submission deadline (users/ SLDC)	Disturbance record and station event log submission deadline (users/ SLDC)	Detailed report and data submission deadline (users/ SLDC)	Draft report submission deadline (RLDC/ NLDC)	Discussion in protection committee meeting and final report submission deadline (RPC)
1	GI-1/GI-2	8 hours	24 hours	+7 days	+7 days	+60 days
2	Near miss **event**	8 hours	24 hours	+7 days	+7 days	+60 days
3	GD-1	8 hours	24 hours	+7 days	+7 days	+60 days
4	GD-2/GD-3	8 hours	24 hours	+7 days	+21 days	+60 days
5	GD-4/GD-5	8 hours	24 hours	+7 days	+30 days	+60 days

^*The classification of Grid Disturbance (GD)/Grid Incident (GI) shall be as per the* CEA Grid Standards.

The forum may deliberate upon the GD/GI/near miss events that occurred in June and July 2026 based on the draft report prepared by NERLDC.

Deliberation

NERLDC informed that during June 2026 and July 2026, a total of 91 Grid Disturbance events were reported in the North- Eastern Region. Out of these; 64 disturbances were associated with radial networks. Among the radial network disturbances, Tuirial and Rengpang accounted for the highest number of incidents, with 22 and 25 occurrences, respectively.

Regarding Loktak-Rengpang line, MSPCL informed that vegetation clearance along the line corridor had recently been completed. Following which, reliability of the line has improved, as reflected in reduced no. of trippings recorded during August.

Forum noted the above

B.3 Status of submission of FIR, DR & EL outputs for the Grid Events for the month of Jun'2026 & Jul'2026:

In line with regulation 12 (1) of CEA Grid Standards Regulations and IEGC-23 provision under clause 37.2 (c), FIR and DR & EL Outputs for each grid events are required to be submitted by concerned utilities to NERLDC for detailed investigation and analysis.

Status of uploading of FIR, DR & EL outputs of tripping of transmission elements in Tripping Monitoring Portal for events from 01-06-2026 to 31-07-2026 as on **10th Aug'26** is given below:

Owner Name	Total No of FIR/DR/EL/TR to be submitted(SEND+REND)	FIR		DR		EL	
		Total Furnished in 24hrs %	Total furnished %	Total Furnished in 24hrs %	Total furnished %	Total Furnished in 24hrs %	Total furnished %
AEGCL	167	0%	43%	4%	57%	4%	56%
APGCL	11	91%	100%	100%	**100%**	100%	100%
DoP, Arunachal Pradesh	42	71%	100%	81%	**100%**	81%	100%
DoP, Nagaland	45	58%	100%	40%	**100%**	47%	100%
MePGCL	12	8%	100%	8%	**92%**	17%	92%
MePTCL	43	77%	100%	100%	**100%**	93%	100%
MSPCL	66	67%	95%	56%	**88%**	35%	88%
MUML	3	33%	100%	67%	**100%**	100%	100%
NBTL	1	100%	100%	100%	**100%**	0%	100%
NEEPCO	100	79%	96%	85%	**97%**	70%	97%
NHPC	106	50%	92%	62%	**96%**	65%	97%
NTL	20	10%	30%	5%	40%	10%	40%
OTPC	15	73%	100%	73%	**100%**	73%	100%
P&ED Mizoram	29	10%	100%	41%	**100%**	41%	100%
POWERGRID	123	67%	98%	**67%**	**98%**	**67%**	**96%**
TPGCL	1	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
TSECL	32	78%	100%	69%	**97%**	72%	97%

Concerned Utilities are requested to upload Disturbance Recorder (DR), Event Logger (EL) outputs for grid events along with a First Information Report (FIR) in Tripping Monitoring Portal (https://tripping.nerldc.in/Default.aspx) for analysis purpose. In light of the cybersecurity measures implemented by Grid India to safeguard sensitive information, NERLDC has created the email address nerldcso3@gmail.com . This new account has been specifically set up to facilitate the secure exchange of DR and EL files that have previously faced blockage when sent to nerldcprotection@grid-india.in.

Also, all utilities are requested to nominate a nodal officer responsible for the submission of FIR, DR & EL in Tripping Monitoring Portal (https://tripping.nerldc.in/Default.aspx)

Deliberation

Forum noted that AEGCL accounted for approximately 22% of the total instances of non-submission or delayed submission of Disturbance Recorder data in the North Eastern Region during June and July 2026. Therefore, AEGCL should take appropriate and necessary action to ensure compliance with the Grid Code requirements regarding the timely submission of FIRs, DRs, and ELs. AEGCL assured that necessary actions will be taken to ensure timely submission of the required data.

Low submission was also observed for NTL. NTL was absent in the meeting.

Forum noted the above

Action: AEGCL & NTL

B.4 Submission of Detailed Report by User/SLDC as per IEGC-2023:

As per IEGC-2023, all User/SLDCs are requested to prepare and share **Flash Report** and **Detailed Report** with **NERLDC** and **NERPC** following any Grid Events as per the timeline mentioned in the cl 37.2(f). Status of submission of the Detailed Report for the month of **June'2026** & **July'2026** as on **12th Aug'2026** is shown below:





All the utilities are requested to promptly share all the necessary information such as FIR, DR, EL and Reports (Flash Report & Detailed Report) as per the specified timeline mention in the Grid Code-2023.

Deliberation

Forum noted the serious non-compliance by MSPCL with regard to submission of reports. MSPCL informed that laptops have been arranged recently at the substations and DR sending facility will be ensured shortly. After which the reports will be prepared timely.

After detailed deliberations, Forum requested the utilities to comply with the IEGC mandates regarding the submission of Detailed Reports.

Forum noted the above

Action: all utilities

B.5 Submission of Protection Performance Indices by Transmission Utilities for Jun'26 & July'26:

As per Regulation No. 15(6), Protection Code - Users shall submit the following protection performance indices of previous month to their respective RPC and RLDC on monthly basis for 220 kV and above (132 kV and above in NER) system by 12th of every month for previous month indices, which shall be reviewed by the RPC.

D Index= (Nc/Nc + Nf)

S Index= (Nc/Nc+Nu)

R Index = (Nc/Nc+Ni)

The submission status as on **11th July'2026** as tabulated below:

Sl. No.	Name of Transmission Licensee	Jun'26			July'26			Remarks
		D	S	R	D	S	R	
1	NETC	–	–	–	-	-	-	No bays owned by NETC
2	MUML	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
3	NBTL	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
4	NTL	Not submitted			Not submitted			-
5	KMTL	1	1	1	1	1	1	No tripping of elements recorded in Jun & Jul'26
6	POWERGRID	1	1	1	1	1	1	As per NERLDC, the indices values are less than 1 for Jun & July'26: 22-06-2026 13:48Hrs, the tripping of 132 kV Silchar - Melriat DC lines observed in ZII protection during fault at 132 kV Sihhmui - Zuangtui (old) line. 18:17 Hrs of 03-07-2026: The tripping of 132kV Panyor-Ziro line at Ziro during fault in the 132 kV Along-Pasighat line was unwanted.
7	MePTCL	0.85	1	0.85	1	0.9	0.9	3rd June'26 22:03 Hrs: Protection Issues at Mendipathar and Nangalbibra observed 30th July'26 06:44 Hrs:

Sl. No.	Name of Transmission Licensee	Jun'26			July'26			Remarks
		D	S	R	D	S	R	
								unwanted tripping of 160 MVA ICT-2 at Byrnihat
8	TPTL	1	1	1	Not submitted			-
9	DoP Nagaland	0.58	1	1	0.75	1	1	Reason not mentioned, Nf: 8 numbers (Wokha & Kohima) in Jun'26 Nf: 6 numbers (Sanis & Kohima) in July'26
10	DoP Arunachal Pradesh	0.91	1.0	0.91	1.00	0.9	0.92	03-06-2026 02:45: 132 kV Napit - Pasighat 1 Line A near-concurrent solid fault occurred on the Napit–Pasighat lines, involving an R-phase-to-ground fault on Ckt-1 and a Y-B-phase-to-ground fault on Ckt-2. The fault on Ckt-2 was cleared from both ends in Zone-1. However, the fault on Ckt-1 appeared to vanish intermittently and was ultimately cleared from the source ends, i.e., the Along end of the Along–Pasighat line and the Roing end of the Roing–Pasighat line, on Zone-2 operation. 09-07-2026 16:05: 132 kV Along-Basar Line During a fault on the 132 kV Bus of Along SS, Along-Basar line tripped at Basar end in Zone-1. Zone-1 operation at

Sl. No.	Name of Transmission Licensee	Jun'26			July'26			Remarks
		D	S	R	D	S	R	
								Basar appears unwanted. 13-07-2026 19:59 Hrs: 132 kV Pasighat- Napit Line-2 SPS operated on fulfilment of SPS conditions. However, SPS Switch was inadvertently kept in "ON" position and therefore the tripping at Pasighat end has been concluded as unwanted.
11	AEGCL	Not submitted			Not submitted			-
12	Mizoram	1	0.96	0.96	Not submitted			16-06-2026 09:11 hrs, the tripping of 132 kV Kolasib - Bairabi line at Kolasib recorded as unwanted.
13	MSPCL	Not submitted			Not submitted			-

Sl. No.	Name of Generating Companies	Jun'26			July'26			Remarks
		D	S	R	D	S	R	
1	NTPC(Bgtpp)	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
2	OTPC(Palatana)	1	1	1				-
3	MePGCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
4	TPGCL				Not submitted			_
5	Loktak (NHPC)	1	1	1	Not submitted			-
6	Subansiri (NHPC)	1	0.5	0.5	Not submitted			12th Ju'26: DC Supply failure 13th June: Due to

Sl. No.	Name of Generating Companies	Jun'26			July'26			Remarks
		D	S	R	D	S	R	
								improper PLC communication.
7	Kameng	1	1	1	1	1	1	No tripping of elements recorded in Jun'26
8	Panyor	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
9	Pare	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
10	Kopili	1	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	06-06-2026 15:22 Hrs: 220 kV Kopili - Missa 2 line. DT sent 20-07-2026 18:06: 220 kV Kopili - Missa 3 line, DT sent GE representative visited site for BCU troubleshooting, and the issue was rectified. Issue with configuration files.
11	Khandong	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
12	Doyang	1	1	1	1	1	1	As per NERLDC, the indices values are less than 1 for July'26 as BB protection operated on 06-07-2026 18:56 Hrs due to external faults.
13	AGBPP	1	1	1	1	1	1	Each tripping details needs to be included along with Indices values.
14	AGTCCPP	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
15	Monarchak	Not submitted			1	1	1	As per NERLDC, the indices values are less than 1 for July'26, as the

Sl. No.	Name of Generating Companies	Jun'26			July'26			Remarks
		D	S	R	D	S	R	
								tripping of STG at Monarchak observed during the GD at Udaipur on 07-07-2026 and 05:14 was unwanted.
16	Tuirial	1	1	1	1	0.958	1	05-07-2026 at 17:51 Hrs: Due to sudden tripping of transformer of other line, momentary voltage fluctuation happened in Kolasib-Tuirial line, as informed by Bawktlang S/S. 132 KV Bawktlang-line breaker auto-reclosed within 2 seconds of fluctuation in voltage at Bawktlang end.

Therefore, all Users are requested to furnish and ensure performance indices (Dependability-D, Security-S, Reliability-R) with regards to the tripping of elements to NERPC & NERLDC positively by **12th** of every month for previous month indices in compliance with IEGC.

Deliberation

Forum noted the serious non-compliance by MSPCL with regard to submission of the performance indices. MSPCL assured to send the indices timely September onwards.

Forum requested all the utilities for timely submission of protection performance indices.

Forum noted the above

Action: MSPCL

B.6 SPS at Namsai for outage of 220 kV Kathalguri–Namsai D/C line:

Tripping of the 220 kV Kathalguri–Namsai D/C line may result in a significant voltage drop, leading to severe low-voltage conditions in the Arunachal Pradesh and Assam power systems. The concern regarding low-voltage conditions following the outage of the line was also highlighted earlier in connection with the request for idle charging of the line along with the 245 kV, 50 MVAR bus reactor at Namsai.

To mitigate the adverse voltage impact following the outage of the 220 kV Kathalguri–Namsai D/C line, NERTS has configured an SPS at Namsai on 31.05.2025, wherein the 245 kV, 50 MVAR bus reactor at Namsai is tripped immediately upon opening/tripping of both 220 kV Kathalguri–Namsai circuits at Namsai end.

In view of the above, NERPC is requested to accord approval to the implemented SPS scheme to ensure system voltage security and avoid severe low-voltage conditions at Namsai and the adjoining Arunachal Pradesh and Assam systems.

Deliberation

After Detailed deliberation the forum approved the said SPS scheme at Namsai.

Forum noted the above

B.7 Revision of SPS Triggering Criteria at BTPS for overloading of 220 kV BTPS–Salakati (PG) Double Circuit:

At present, a SPS is in service for the 220 kV BTPS–Salakati (PG) Double Circuit to prevent overloading of the transmission lines. The existing SPS triggering logic is as follows:

When the current flow in either of the 220 kV BTPS (Salakati)–Salakati (PG) Circuit-I or Circuit-II exceeds 1000 A continuously for 1.1 seconds, an “SPS Operate” signal is transmitted from BTPS to Agia through the OPGW communication network. Upon receipt of the SPS operate signal at Agia, the 220 kV Agia–Chayagaon/Boko and 220 kV Agia–Mirza circuit breakers are tripped. This scheme is presently intended to prevent overloading of the 220 kV BTPS–Salakati (PG) transmission lines.

The 220 kV BTPS–Salakati (PG) Double Circuit has subsequently been reconductored with HTLS conductors, having a rated current-carrying capacity of 1100 A. In recent months, it has been observed that the combined loading of the

220 kV BTPS–Salakati (PG) Double Circuit has exceeded 460 MW, while the loading during peak hours has been consistently above 400 MW on a daily basis.

The increasing loading on the 220 kV BTPS–Salakati (PG) Double Circuit may primarily be attributed to the following factors:

1. Low generation from gas-based power plants in the NER, particularly the gas plants located in the Tripura power system including ISGS gas plants.
2. Non-availability of the Panyor Lower HEP.
3. Increase in demand in the NER region.

Under the present operating conditions, the high loading of the 220 kV BTPS–Salakati (PG) Double Circuit may result in the SPS triggering under certain N-1 contingency conditions, even though the line has been reconductored with HTLS conductors having a rated capacity of 1100 A. Such unnecessary SPS operation may lead to tripping of the 220 kV Agia–Boko and Agia–Mirza circuits and may adversely affect the overall system operation.

Considering the enhanced current-carrying capacity of the reconductored line, it is proposed that the existing SPS triggering threshold of 1000 A be revised to 1200 A, corresponding to approximately 110% of the rated current capacity of 1100 A. The existing time delay of 1.1 seconds may be retained without any change. Accordingly, the proposed revised SPS setting is:

Parameter	**Existing Setting**	**Proposed Setting**
Current threshold	1000 A	**1200 A**
Time delay	1.1 seconds	**1.1 seconds**

The above issue has already been highlighted by the NERLDC team to NERPC, POWERGRID, and the AEGCL protection team vide email dated 12th Aug'26. NERPC and POWERGRID have conveyed their concurrence over telephonic communication for taking necessary action in this regard.

In view of the above, AEGCL is requested to kindly revise the SPS triggering current setting from the existing 1000 A to 1200 A at BTPS, while retaining the existing time

delay of 1.1 seconds, at the earliest, so as to align the SPS setting with the present HTLS conductor rating and prevailing system operating conditions.

Deliberation

AEGCL informed that the existing SPS triggering threshold for the 220 kV BTPS–Salakati (PG) Double Circuit has been revised from 1000 A to 1200 A while retaining the existing time delay i.e 1.1s. The revised setting has been effective since14.08.2026.

Forum noted the above

B.8 GD at North Lakhimpur area of Assam on 19th Jun'26:

The North Lakhimpur area of Assam is connected to the rest of the power grid through the 132 kV North Lakhimpur–Gohpur D/C lines**,** 132 kV North Lakhimpur–Nirjuli**,** and 132 kV North Lakhimpur–Pare transmission lines. The Majuli**,** Silapathar**,** and Dhemaji areas are connected **radially** through the North Lakhimpur substation.

At 09:12 Hrs of 19-06-2026, due to tripping of 132 kV North Lakhimpur - Gohpur D/C & 132 kV North Lakhimpur–Nirjuli**,** blackout at occurred at North Lakhimpur, Majuli, Dhemaji and Silapathar.



As per the Detailed report submitted by AEGCL: -

The sequence of events -

i) The 132kV N. Lakhimpur – Pare Line and the 132kV N. Lakhimpur – Nirjuli line travels the majority of the distance sharing the double circuit towers. The flow of B phase fault current (together with generation of Zero-sequence current) from the fault feed from Nirjuli – N. Lakhimpur Bus – Faul location in Gohpur Line II, formed the necessary mutual coupling effect on the 132kV N. Lakhimpur – Pare Line (The Zero-sequence coupling effect was enhanced as the circuit was earthed at both ends.)

ii) The Distance Relay at N. Lakhimpur end for the 132kV N. Lakhimpur – Pare Line issued a trip on Zone-1 Protection (No voltage present, as line was under shutdown and current was read by the relay due to mutual induction)

iii) It is to be noted that, VT Fuse Fail will not block the distance protection in this case, as the I2/I1 ratio for the above case was not met. The phase angles of all the phases are same, hence, there is no I2 or I1 current formation. Only Zero-Sequence current is present

iv) The relay issued at trip and "LBB Internal Initiation" was made "*high*", the CB was already read "open" by the relay (Line under shutdown). The fault current continued flowing after the trip was issued by the relay. Hence, LBB Busbar trip was activated after a delay of 100ms.

v) All the feeders connected to the 132kV Bus at N. Lakhimpur were hence tripped on LBB protection

Protection issues observed: Zero-Sequence Mutual Coupling effect leading to LBB Operation

Remedial Measures: The LBB busbar trip delay will be increased from 100ms to 200ms. The "*Mutual Compensation CT wirings*" will be carried out between the Pare and Nirjuli Panels. The LBB protection will be kept OFF when lines are under shutdown and earthed at both ends (for double circuit lines) at N. Lakhimpur end. *(The Pare Panels are not under AEGCL Jurisdiction)*

Hence, AEGCL is requested to make necessary changes in coordination with the MUML (Pare line bay owner at N Lakhimpur).

Additionally, AEGCL is requested to adhere to the mandates of IEGC'23 regarding the timely submission of DR & EL files and detailed event reports.

Deliberation

Forum directed AEGCL to –

i. Increase the LBB operation time setting to 200 ms.

ii. Ensure the completion of mutual compensation CT wirings in coordination with MUML.

iii. To ensure LBB protection is kept OFF, when lines are under shutdown, and lines are earthed at both ends.

Forum noted the above

Action: AEGCL

B.9 GD at Along area of Arunachal Pradesh 9th July'26:

At 16:05 hrs on 9th July 2026, in order to commission the 132 kV TBC Bay at Along Substation, the 89T isolator of the ICT Bay was closed with due permission from SLDC. At 16:05 hrs, an insulator on the 132 kV transfer bus ruptured, resulting in a B-phase-to-neutral (B-N) fault on the 132 kV bus at Along Substation.

The **132 kV transfer bus** at Along Substation was isolated, following which the substation was successfully re-energized through the main bus.



For the 132 kV Along-Basar line, Zone-4 Start was initiated at Along prior to tripping of the line from the Basar end by Zone-1 protection and subsequent LBB operation at Basar within 150 ms. The 132 kV Along-Pasighat line was isolated at the Along end by Zone-4 protection within 260 ms, resulting in the blackout of Along Substation. The Along-Pasighat line, however, remained energized from the Pasighat end.

Protection issues observed:

- Zone-1 operation at the Basar end for a fault on the 132 kV bus at Along Substation appears to be unwanted and requires investigation.
- At the Basar end, the B-phase pole opened within 80 ms following Zone-1 operation. However, the fault continued to be fed towards Along through the B-phase, resulting in LBB operation within 150 ms, followed by three-pole tripping. The reason for the failure of fault clearance following single-pole opening requires detailed investigation and appropriate corrective measures.
- The similar CB opening issue at Basar end of 132 kV Along – Basar line also observed at 09:30 Hrs of 4th August 2026.

Hence, DoP, Arunachal is requested to take corrective action at the earliest.

Deliberation

DoP Ar. Pradesh informed that the matter of CB and relay setting at Basar have been escalated to Comprehensive Powergrid as the O&M of the substation is still under Powergrid.

Forum urged DoP Ar. Pradesh to resolve the matter, in coordination with Powergrid at the earliest

Forum noted the above

Action: DoP Ar. Pradesh & PGCIL

B.10 Unreliable Auxiliary Power Supply at Lower Subansiri HEP:

On 12 June 2026, Unit-3 of Lower Subansiri HEP tripped at 18:59 hrs due to tripping of its UAT. Subsequently, at 19:45 hrs, Units-1 & 2 along with 400 kV Subansiri–Biswanath Chariali Ckt-3 & Ckt-4 tripped, resulting in total blackout at Lower Subansiri HEP and generation loss of 694 MW. Unit-4 was already under forced outage.

Following the UAT failure of Unit-3, its auxiliary supply is being extended through the UAT of Unit-1 as a temporary arrangement. Further, the single 33 kV HT source available at Subansiri has been reported to be unreliable for station auxiliary supply.

In July'26, Unit-1 and Unit-3 tripping observed 13 and 16 times respectively.

Under the temporary arrangement, Unit-3 tripped 8 times during July 2026, particularly during outages of Unit-1/DG supply, indicating inadequate reliability and redundancy of the present auxiliary supply arrangement. The list of tripping and rough schematic diagram are attached in **Annexure I**

Hence, NHPC is requested to expedite replacement of the UAT of Unit-3 and clarify the existing and planned arrangements for reliable and redundant station auxiliary supply, including compliance with the applicable CEA requirements regarding provision of two independent HT sources. The long-term plan for ensuring reliable station supply at the 2000 MW Lower Subansiri HEP may also be shared.

Deliberation

NHPC absent in the meeting, Forum decided to refer the matter to 241st OCC meeting for discussion.

Forum noted with concern the non-participation by NHPC and referred the issue to OCC

Action: NERPC & NHPC

B.11 GD Tuirial HEP of NEEPCO due to frequent tripping of the 132 kV Kolasib – Tuirial line' July26:

Tuirial HEP (2*31 MW) of Mizoram power system was connected with rest of NER grid through 132 kV Tuirial-Kolasib Line only.

In July'26, the tripping of the said line observed 22 times at Tuirial end as summarised below-

1. **Tripping at Tuirial end only:** 11 times, tripping occurred at Tuirial end only. Out of 11 times, 7 times fault was confirmed in the 132 kV Kolasib-Bairabi line, and 1 time fault was observed in the 132 kV Kolasib – Badarpur line.
2. **Tripping at Both the ends:** 6 times the CB tripped at Kolasib end only indicating the fault in the 132 kV Kolasib – Tuirial line itself.

3. **Details not verified:** 4 times in 26th – 28th July'26, the tripping confirmed at Tuirial end. But P&ED has not confirmed the tripping at Kolasib end. However, the DR data of the main relay showing EF pickup indicating likely the fault in the 132 kV Tuirial line itself.

This indicates a huge number of tripping occurred only at Tuirial end during fault beyond the line caused by the Highset EF protection enabled with Time delay of only 50 msecs only.



To avoid such high number of generating plant outage, NERLDC has proposing the following action points-

Action to be taken by P&ED, Mizoram:

1. Regular line maintenance to avoid outage of Tuirial generating plant.
2. Replace the backup relay at Kolasib for Tuirial line for which DR extraction is not possible. Hence, impacting the proper fault analysis.

Action to be taken by Tuirial (NEEPCO):

1. Disable the Highset EF protection at Tuirial end in line with the NER Protection Philosophy.

Deliberation

NEEPCO informed the Forum that, out of the 22 instances of tripping of the 132 kV Kolasib–Tuirial line, 16 instances were cleared at the Tuirial end only.

NEEPCO further informed that they had collected and analyzed the relay settings of the Main and Backup protections at the Kolasib end of the 132 kV Kolasib–Tuirial line. As per their analysis, the Zone-I protection at the Kolasib end covers only about 30% of the transmission line. Therefore, faster fault clearance from the Kolasib end may not be possible through the existing Main and Backup protection settings.

In view of the requirement to ensure the safety and protection of the generating machines, Tuirial expressed its inability to revise the High-Set Backup protection implemented in the P127 relay at this stage. NEEPCO added that CPRI has conducted the third-party protection audit at Tuirial station and report will be submitted within 20 days.

Forum Directed NEEPCO to share the complete relay setting analysis carried out for the Kolasib end. Additionally, NEEPCO shall provide the third-party protection audit report of Tuirial Power Station at the earliest.

The Forum also decided to form a committee to investigate the issue in detail, in light of the audit report of CPRI, and identify a permanent solution for rectification of the recurring tripping problem.

Forum noted the above

Action: NEEPCO

B.12 Protection Issue at Sihhmui SS during Jun and July'26:

The Zuangtui(old) SS was radially connected from either of the 132 kV Zuangtui-Zuangtui(old) line or 132 kV Sihhmui – Zuangtui(Old) line.



Event I:

At 13:48 Hrs on 22nd June'26, during fault in the 132 kV Sihhmui – Zuangtui(old) line, the tripping of the 132 kV Melriat - Sihhmui 2 Line, 132 kV Silchar - Melriat 1&2 Line observed.

Detailed analysis:

R-N fault (Ir-2.5 kA, In-2.5 kA) occurred in the system at 13:48 Hrs due to fault in 132 kV Sihhmui-Zuangtui(old) line while attempting charging of the line. Fault was detected in ZI from Sihhmui end and issued trip command, however CB failed to open at Sihhmui end.

As a result, fault was continuously feeding from 132 kV Silchar - Melriat (PG)-Sihhmui link. Consequently, fault was cleared within 549 msec by tripping of healthy 132 kV Silchar - Melriat (PG) D/C lines on operation of ZII from Silchar end. 132 kV Melriat (PG) - Sihhmui II line tripped on ZII within 417 msec from Melriat (PG) end, however no tripping observed for 132 kV Melriat (PG)-Sihhmui I line.

Root cause informed by P&ED, Mizoram: As informed by P&ED Mizoram, Conductor between CT & Isolator of Zuangtui old bay at 132kV Sihhmui S/S got burnt.

Event II:

At 05:08 Hrs on 14th July'26, during fault in the 132 kV Sihhmui – Zuangtui(old) line, the tripping of the 132 kV Aizawl - Melriat (PG) Line observed.

Detailed analysis:

R-N fault (Ir-1.1 kA, In-1.1 kA) occurred in the system at 05:08 Hrs due to fault in 132 kV Sihhmui-Zuangtui(old) line at FD: 10.4 KM detected in ZI from Sihhmui end and issued trip command, however CB failed to open at Sihhmui end. The fault current was observed for 850 msecs from Sihhmui end.

The Aizawl end of 132 kV Aizawl (PG)- Melriat (PG) line tripped on operation of ZIII in 850 msecs.

Protection Issues observed:

1. Non opening or delayed opening of the CB at Sihhmui end of 132 kV Sihhmui – Zuangtui(old) line in ZI fault.
2. The distance relay setting may be reviewed for the 132 kV Sihhmui – Zuangtui(old) line. Also, CT polarity may be reviewed as well.

3. ZII coordination issues at Silchar end of 132 kV Silchar – Melriat (PG) DC lines.
4. ZIII coordination issues at Aizawl end of 132 kV Aizawl (PG)- Melriat (PG) lines.

Deliberation

As per P&ED, suspected fault was in the R-phase isolator at Sihhmui end of 132 kV Sihhmui – Zuangtui(old) line.

NERTS informed the Forum that, with reference to the faults on the 132 kV Sihhmui–Old Zuangtui feeder on 14.07.2026 and 14.08.2026, delayed fault clearance/CB opening was observed at the Sihhmui end in both instances. This delayed operation resulted in the unwanted tripping of the 132 kV Aizawl–Melriat feeder from Zone-III protection after 800 ms.

Accordingly, NERTS requested P&ED, Mizoram to investigate the reason for the delayed/non-operation of the circuit breaker during faults and to review the relay setting coordination of the 132 kV Sihhmui–Old Zuangtui feeder at the Sihhmui end, so as to prevent recurrence of such unwanted trippings from the Aizawl end.

Additionally, NERTS requested forum to allow reducing ZIII setting from 800 msecs to 650 msecs for the Melriat(PG) end of 132 kV Melriat (PG) – Sihhmui DC lines. The forum agreed on the same.

Forum directed P&ED, Mizoram to check the circuit breaker at Sihhmui Substation and rectify any probable errors in the relay settings in coordination with NERTS. P&ED, Mizoram shall also share the relay settings with NERPC and NERLDC.

Forum noted the above

Action: P&ED Mizoram, Powergrid

B.13 Protection Issues at the Ningthoukhong SS on 27th Jun'26:

Before the event, 132 kV Loktak – Ningthoukhong line was under tripped condition since 25-Jun-2026.

At 17:29 Hrs of 27th Jun'26,

Element Name	Line Length	Outage Duration (D.HH:MM)	Relay Indication	Remakrs

132 kV Imphal (PG) - Ningthoukong 1 Line	27.5 KM	0.00:38	DP, ZIII, B-E, FD: 69.51 KM, 1.3 KA; Cleared in 866 msecs	No Tripping; In>1 started for 866 msecs	**Fault beyond the line**
132 kV Imphal(PG)-Ningthoukhong 2 Line	32.5 KM	0.00:39	DP, ZII, B-E, FD: 45.63 KM, 1.6 kA; Cleared in 305 msecs	No Tripping	**Fault beyond the line**
132 kV Imphal(PG)-Ningthoukhong 3 Line	32.5 KM	1.22:44	No Tripping; EF started for 960 msecs; DPR not initiated	Earth Fault; L1-3.61KA L2-O.30KA L3-0.36KA	Fault likely in the line closer to Ningthoukhong SS



The fruitful analysis could not be performed due to the non-submission of the DR at Ningthoukhong end.

Hence, MSPCL is requested to share the root cause of the tripping.

Deliberation

MSPCL informed that complete analysis of the fault could not be done due to non-availability of DR. He added that the fault location could not be ascertained.

However, MSPCL added, that they have raised the recording issue with the Siemens relay at Ningthoukhong.

Forum strongly requested MSPCL to taken necessary actions at the earliest.

Forum noted the above

Action: MSPCL

B.14 GD at Doyang HPS of Nagaland on 6th July'26:

Prior to the event of 18:56 Hrs:

Elements connected to Bus-I: 132 kV Dimapur-Doyang I line, Doyang Unit-2 & 3

Elements connected to Bus-II: 132 kV Dimapur-Doyang II, 132 kV Doyang-Sanis, 132 kV Doyang-Mokokchung lines, Doyang Unit-1 & 132/33 kV Transformer-1 at Doyang



Event Analysis:

At 18:56 Hrs on 06-07-2026, metallic R-B-N faults occurred almost simultaneously on both 132 kV Dimapur–Doyang I and II lines.

- On Dimapur–Doyang I, the fault was detected in Zone-II (Ir-2.1 kA, Ib-0.63 kA, In-2.79 kA) at the Dimapur end and cleared within 85 ms through carrier-aided tripping, while the Doyang end detected it in Zone-I and cleared it within 55 ms. Auto-reclosing (AR) was successful from the Dimapur end. Subsequently, at 18:56:29.221 Hrs, a Bus Bar trip command was issued for 132 kV Doyang Bus-I, resulting in the tripping of the Bus Coupler.
- On Dimapur–Doyang II, the metallic R-B-N fault (Ir-2.4 kA, Ib-5 kA, In-3.9 kA) was detected and cleared by Zone-I protection at the Doyang end within 65 ms, while the Dimapur end cleared the fault within 76 ms through carrier-aided protection. AR was also successful from the Dimapur end.
- Also, as per the DR of Bus Bar protection, ZA & ZB differential current of 494 A and 60 A observed during the initiation of the line fault. Hence, ZA tripping command issued by the relay caused the tripping of connected elements in the Bus I.

At 19:05 Hrs and 19:14 Hrs, two independent transmission line trippings originated from the Doyang end without any corresponding operation at the remote ends:

- At 19:05:46.410 Hrs, the 132 kV Doyang–Sanis line tripped on Zone-II protection from the Doyang end. Only. No fault present in the system. Low voltages in all the 3 phases observed.
- At 19:14:52.870 Hrs, the 132 kV Doyang–Mokokchung line tripped on Zone-I protection from the Doyang end. Low voltage observed in the R phase only.

As per the Detailed report submitted by Doyang (NEEPCO):

The UI m/c & UIII were in running/generating condition. 18:56 Hrs due to extremely bad weather thunder strike, the main bus bar differential operated due to transient fault. At the same time, all the bays connected in the Bus (Both) got tripped, including the bus coupler. Station supply also tripped (the elements UI m/c, DD-II feeder, Doyang- Sainis, Doyang -Mkg, Station supply is in Bus B). After some time, due to extremely bad weather, voltage jerks happened, and Doyang-Sainis, Doyang-Mkg, and Unit-I tipped.

Protection issues observed:

Doyang (NEEPCO) to update the following queries –

1. **Unwanted operation of BB protection:** Both the 132 kV Dimapur- Doyang 1- & 2-line faults were cleared rapidly by the primary protection schemes with successful auto-reclosing from the Dimapur end & Doyang end; however, a subsequent **Bus Bar protection operation at Doyang Bus-I** caused the **Bus Coupler** to trip was unwanted. The root cause and remedial measures may be taken to avoid such unwanted BB operation.
2. **Low voltage Situation:** The tripping of Doyang–Sanis line and 132 kV Doyang–Mokokchung line from Doyang, with no fault in the system, indicating the need for detailed investigation into the protection operation at the Doyang end.
3. **Review of the Bus Coupler protection settings**: Backup OC initiated in the Bus Coupler. The same is not mandated as per the NER protection philosophy.

Hence, NEEPCO is requested share the root cause and corrective action for above mentioned points.

Deliberation

NEEPCO informed that BUS Bar protection settings and Bus coupler protection settings have been downloaded from relay and sent to OEM for analysis. He added that the Bus Bar stability test for Bus I will be carried out in Jan'27.

Forum strongly requested NEEPCO to complete the Bus Bar protection analysis at the earliest.

Forum noted the above

Action: NEEPCO

B.15 GD at P K Bari area of Tripura 17th July 2026:

PK Bari area of Tripura Power System is connected with the rest of the NER grid through 132 kV AGTCCPP-PK Bari D/C lines, 132 kV PK Bari (NTL)-PK Bari, 132 kV PK Bari-Kumarghat, 132 kV PK Bari-Dharmanagar & 132 kV PK Bari-Kamalpur lines.

At 18:43 hours on 17-07-2026, all 132 kV lines connected to PK Bari (Tripura) substation tripped, resulting in the blackout of 132 kV PK Bari (Tripura) substation.



Root cause shared by TPTL: R-Phase Al tube link between 132kV CB and Line Isolator of 132kV P.K.Bari(ISTS)-P.K.Bari(TPTL) Line at P.K.Bari(TPTL) end got disconnected from CB as the connecting pad cracked open and resulted flashover.

Analysis:

Metallic fault of LLG observed in the system. First the fault was observed in R & Y phase for 111 msecs then converted into RYG for 580 msecs.

Protection/Operational issues observed:

As per TPTL,

- R-Phase Al tube link between 132kV CB and Line Isolator of 132kV P.K.Bari(ISTS)-P.K.Bari(TPTL) Line at P.K.Bari(TPTL) end got disconnected from CB as the connecting pad cracked open and resulted flashover.
- It was also observed that the “cct fail Z1” alarm is in raised condition for Bus-Bar Relay, which resulted non-operation of Bus-bar differential relay to isolate this fault

Additional Points from NERLDC-

1. **P K Bari (TPTL):** Non-operation of the Bus Bar protection at P K Bari (TPTL) & reason for tripping on DT received is not confirmed.
2. **P K Bari(NTL):** Initiation of ZIII observed. However, ZII not initiated; Unwanted DT sent from NTL end.

3. **Kamalpur:** CB not opened after issuing ZII trip command by the DPR needs to be reviewed.
4. **Kumarghat:** ZIII tripping in 361 msecs needs to be reviewed;
5. DR standardization required at CB11.
6. Time drift observed for CB1 (10 min), CB3 (1 min), CB4 (4 min), CB9 (2 min), CB10 (5 min).

Deliberation

Regarding Bus Bar issue at P K Bari, TPTL submitted that here was some issue with the circuits, the matter has been taken up with the OEM for resolution. Regarding the CB issue at Kamalpur, TPTL informed that there was some issue with the software which will be resolved within a week.

The Forum directed Tripura to resolve the circuit breaker (CB) issue at Kamalpur and ensure the proper healthiness of the Busbar (BB) protection system at P. K. Bari (TPTL) Substation.

NTL was absent from the meeting. However, the Forum directed NTL to share the details of the tripping at the P. K. Bari end, including the reason for the fault clearance time exceeding 350 ms and the reason for the transmission of the Direct Trip (DT) signal from the P. K. Bari (NTL) end.

Further, the Forum directed NERTS to normalize the Zone protection time settings at the Kumarghat end of the 132 kV Kumarghat–P. K. Bari line, based on confirmation from TPTL regarding the replacement of the circuit breaker at the P. K. Bari end.

Forum noted the above

Action: TPTL and Powergrid

C. FOLLOW–UP AGENDA ITEMS

C.1 GD at Doyang Power Station of NEEPCO and Sanis area of Nagaland on 1st July'26:

Before the event, 132 kV Dimapur Doyang –II was under planned shutdown w.e.f. 09:44 Hrs of 01-07-2026. 132 kV Sanis-Wokha was under forced outage wef 06:43 Hrs of 01-07-2026.

At 15:37 Hrs, LLG, metallic fault in 132 kV Doyang – Mokokchung line cleared from Mokokchung end in ZI protection and Doyang & Dimapur (PG) end of Mokokchung & Doyang -1 line within 560 msecs on operation of ZII protection resulted into GD at Doyang & Sanis area. Load loss: 1 MW & Generation loss of 18 MW recorded. Power supply was extended to Doyang power station of NEEPCO & Sanis area of Nagaland by charging 132 kV Dimapur - Doyang ckt 1 at 16:22 Hrs 17:17 Hrs of 01-07-2026.



Protection issues observed:

The 500 msecs time delay for ZII is in line with the NERPC protection philosophy for ZII time delay.

Reviewing of the ZII time is required as there is no DTPC & PLCC does not supports Tele-protection, hence carrier aided protection was not operated at Doyang end of 132 kV Mokokchung line.

In the pre-PCC GD discussion meeting held on 14.08.2026, NERPC suggested to change Z2 delay at Doyang for Mokokchung line to 400 msec and at Dimapur (PG) to 600 msec for Doyang line.

PGCIL and NEEPCO may update on action taken.

Deliberation

Forum requested DoP, Nagaland to install the DTPC &/or PLCC for carrier aided tripping for the 132 kV Doyang – Mokokchung line at the earliest.

Till the carrier aided protection is installed, NERPC suggested to modify the ZII delay settings as mentioned above.

PGCIL and NEEPCO assured to modify the settings shortly.

Forum noted the above

Action: PGCIL and NEEPCO

C.2 Proposal for SPS for the 220 kV BTPS–Agia D/C Corridor:

(Ref Agenda B.10 | 90th PCCM |23rd June 2026)

Due to delays in the commissioning of the upcoming 400 kV Sonapur and 400 kV Rangia substations in Assam, high loading is expected on the following transmission corridors:

- 400 kV Bongaigaon–Azara line
- 220 kV BTPS–Agia D/C
- 220 kV Balipara-Sonabil DC

System studies indicate that during periods of high demand in the North Eastern Region, particularly in the Assam power system, the combined loading of 400 kV Bongaigaon-Azara line and 220 kV BTPS-Agia DC may exceed 600 MW for longer duration.

Under such operating conditions, tripping of the 400 kV Bongaigaon–Azara line may result in critical loading of approximately 190 MW on each circuit of the 220 kV Agia–BTPS D/C line. Subsequent tripping of the 220 kV Agia–BTPS D/C line may

lead to cascading outages in the Assam power system and may results into grid disturbances in both the Capital Region and the BTPS–Rangia area of the Assam power system.

To minimise the impact of the above contingency, a meeting was held on 29.05.2026 at the SLDC Assam office with officials from NERLDC, SLDC Assam, and AEGCL to deliberate on the implementation of a new System Protection Scheme (SPS) in the NER power system. The proposed SPS envisages automatic disconnection of approximately 45 MW of load at Agia and nearby substations whenever the loading on the 220 kV BTPS–Agia D/C line exceeds 500 A. This scheme is intended to prevent overloading of the corridor and avoid the possibility of cascading outages during contingency conditions. The minutes of the meeting are enclosed as **Annexure-I.**

However, considering the criticality of the issue elaborated above, the SPS should only be viewed as an interim mitigation measure. As a long-term solution to ensure reliable and secure operation of the Assam power system, Assam is requested to accord priority to the strengthening of the 220 kV Agia–BTPS D/C line and expedite its implementation.

Deliberation (90th PCCM |23rd June 2026):

Assam informed that the SPS will be implemented by mid-July'26.

AEGCL to update

Deliberation

AEGCL updated that the SPS will be implemented by the end of August 2026.

Forum noted the above

Action: AEGCL

C.3 Grid Disturbances at Lower Subansiri HEP on 12th and 13th June 2026:

(Ref Agenda B.14 | 90th PCCM |23rd June 2026)

On 12th June 2026 and 13th June 2026 total black out occurred at Lower Subansiri HEP with tripping of all the running units and all the evacuating lines. The details of the above events are appended below.

Event -1 On 12th June 2026 at Lower Subansiri HEP:

At 18:59 hrs on 12th June 2026, Unit-3 tripped due to tripping of its Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT). Subsequently, at 19:45 hrs on 12th June 2026, Unit-1 and Unit-2, along with the associated evacuation lines, namely 400 kV Subansiri–Biswanath Chariali Ckt-3 and Ckt-4, tripped, resulting in Grid Disturbance and total black out at the Lower Subansiri HEP with generation loss of 694 MW. Prior to the above event Unit-4 at Lower Subansiri was under forced outage.

Sl No.	Element Name	Outage time	Revival Time	Reason	Remarks
1	Subansiri Lower HEP - UNIT 3	12-06-2026 18:59	-	Due to the tripping of UAT	Generation loss of 230 MW
2	400KV-BISWANATH CHARIALI-SUBANSIRI-3	12-06-2026 19:45	12-06-2026 20:55	Auxiliary supply failure at Subansiri & No tripping at Biswanath Chariali for Line-3 and DT received for line-4	Tripping of all the elements resulted into GD at Lower Subansiri with generation loss of 464 MW (Unit 1 & 2); Total loss of Generation: 694 MW
3	400KV-BISWANATH CHARIALI-SUBANSIRI-4	12-06-2026 19:45	12-06-2026 21:46		
4	Subansiri Lower HEP - UNIT 1	12-06-2026 19:45	12-06-2026 21:32	Auxiliary supply failure at Subansiri	
5	Subansiri Lower HEP - UNIT 2	12-06-2026 19:45	12-06-2026 21:14		

Event -2 On 13th June 2026 at Lower Subansiri HEP:

Again, on 13th June 2026 at 11:41 hrs, Unit-1 and Unit-2, along with 400 kV Lower Subansiri–Biswanath Chariali Ckt-3 and Ckt-4, tripped, resulting Grid Disturbance

and total black out at the Lower Subansiri HEP with generation loss of 465 MW. Prior to the above event Unit-4 and Unit-3 at Lower Subansiri was under forced outage.

Sl No.	Element Name	Outage time	Revival Time	Reason	Remarks
1	400KV-BISWANATH CHARIALI-SUBANSIRI-3	13-06-2026 11:41	13-06-2026 12:35	GIS breakers tripped due to unhealthy GIS controller at Subansiri; No tripping at Biswanath Chariali for Line-3	Tripping of all the elements resulted into GD at Lower Subansiri with generation loss of 465 MW (Unit 1 & 2)
2	400KV-BISWANATH CHARIALI-SUBANSIRI-4	13-06-2026 11:41	13-06-2026 12:47		
3	Subansiri Lower HEP - UNIT 1	13-06-2026 11:41	13-06-2026 12:46	GIS breakers tripped due to unhealthy GIS controller at Subansiri	
4	Subansiri Lower HEP - UNIT 2	13-06-2026 11:41	13-06-2026 12:43		

Action Required from Lower Subansiri HEP (NHPC):

1. Identify the root cause and report implement remedial measures to prevent recurrence of similar total blackout incidents.
2. Submit a detailed report for the Grid Events.
3. Expedite restoration of Unit-4, which has been under forced outage since 12.05.2026.
4. Expedite restoration of 400 kV, 80 MVAR Bus Reactor-1, which has been under forced outage since 20.05.2026.

NHPC to update the status of the followings-

1. Replacement of DC Battery Bank
2. Replacement of Plant Inverter System
3. SCADA System Modernization
4. Replacement of Unit Auxiliary Transformers

NHPC to update

Deliberation

NHPC was absent in the meeting. NERPC informed that NHPC vide email dated. 19.08.2026 have provided the update as follow-

1.Root Cause & Remedial Measures: The root cause of the total blackout incident has been analyzed in detail, and necessary corrective and preventive measures have been implemented to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.

2. Detailed Grid Event Report: A detailed report covering the sequence of events, protection operation, equipment response, restoration process and corrective actions was submitted through email on 21.07.2026.

3. Restoration of Unit-4: Unit-4 was restored and synchronised on 09.07.2026 following replacement of the damaged GT with a spare GT. The unit had remained under forced outage since 12.05.2026.

4. Restoration of 400 kV, 80 MVAR Bus Reactor-I: Restoration of 400 kV, 80 MVAR Bus Reactor-I, which has been under forced outage since 20.05.2026, is being pursued with OEM on priority. Necessary repair/rectification activities are being expedited, with restoration targeted by 31.08.2026.

Updated Status as on Date: -

1. Replacement of DC Battery Banks Two 240 V, 1550 Ah DC battery banks were commissioned in July 2026 and are currently in service.

2. Replacement of Plant Inverter System The design drawings have been approved, and clearance has been accorded for manufacturing. The existing inverter system will be replaced during the lean-generation season or the next planned plant outage, whichever occurs earlier.

3. SCADA System Modernization - Comprehensive modernization of the plant SCADA system is currently underway. Commissioning of Unit-5 under the new SCADA platform has been completed. Modernization of Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 is planned during the lean-generation season or the next planned plant outage, whichever occurs earlier.

4. Replacement Of Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UATS) The PO for five new UATs has already been placed, of which two UATs are expected to be available at site by the end of October 2026. In addition, two UATs refurbished by the OEM, M/s Crompton Greaves Limited, are expected to arrive at site shortly.

Forum noted the above

Action: NHPC

C.4 <u>Frequent unwanted tripping of 400/132 kV Kameng ICT:</u>

(Ref Agenda B.15 | 90th PCCM |23rd June 2026)

400/132 kV Kameng ICT tripped multiple times since Apr'2026 causing grid disturbance in Khupi & Seppa areas of Arunachal Pradesh which is a matter of serious concern.

The details of the events are shown below:

Event 1: At 15:38 Hrs of 22nd April'26

Sl. No.	Element Name	Tripping Time	Relay Indication A	Relay Indication B	Analysis based on FIR/DR/EL
1	132 kV Tenga-Khupi Line	22-04-2026 15:38	DP, ZII, Y-N	Distance protection optd	Y-N fault (Iy-1.3 kA, In-1.3 kA) in 132 kV Tenga-Khupi Line initiated at 15:28:46.495 Hrs and cleared within 432 msec from Tenga end on operation of DP, ZII. Distance protection operated at Khupi end. At 15:29:03.515 Hrs, Kameng ICT tripped on E/F Stg-II within 69 msec
2	3X40 MVA, 400/132 kV ICT at Kameng	22-04-2026 15:38	E/F Stg-2 in HV side operated within 69 msec		

Event 2: At 09:57 Hrs of 30th April'26

Sl. No.	Element Name	Tripping Time	Relay Indication A	Relay Indication B	Analysis based on FIR/DR/EL

1	132 kV Khupi-Seppa Line	30-04-2026 09:57	E/F	No tripping (radial)	As per information from DoP Arunachal Pradesh, 132 kV Khupi-Seppa line tripped on E/F from Khupi end. At 09:57 Hrs, Kameng ICT tripped on E/F Stg-I within 3.5 sec
2	3X40 MVA, 400/132 kV ICT at Kameng	30-04-2026 09:57	E/F Stg-1 in HV side operated		

Event 3: At 17:24 Hrs of 10th May'26

Sl. No.	Element Name	Tripping Time	Relay Indication A	Relay Indication B	Analysis based on FIR/DR/EL
1	132 kV Tenga-Khupi Line	10-05-2026 09:57	Auto Recloser successful from both ends		R-N fault (Ir-2.7 kA, In-2.8 kA) initiated at 17:23:08.367 hrs which was cleared within 73 msec from Khupi end on operation of DP, ZI. Fault cleared within 142 msec from Tenga end on DP, ZI. AR operated successfully after 1.6 sec from both ends. At 17:23:04.470 Hrs, Kameng ICT tripped on E/F Stg-II within 76 msec.
2	3X40 MVA, 400/132 kV ICT at Kameng	10-05-2026 09:57	E/F Stg-2 in HV side operated within 76 msec		

Event 4: At 13:38 Hrs of 21st May'26

Sl. No.	Element Name	Tripping Time	Relay Indication A	Relay Indication B	Analysis based on FIR/DR/EL
1	132 kV Tenga-Khupi Line	21-05-2026 13:38	DP, ZI, R-N, AR unsuccessful	DP, ZI, R-N, AR unsuccessful	R-N fault (Ir-1.5 kA, In-1.4 kA) initiated at 13:38:15.107 Hrs

2	3X40 MVA, 400/132 kV ICT at Kameng	21-05-2026 13:38	E/F Stg-2 in HV side operated within 70 msec	which was cleared within 81 msec from Tenga end on operation of DP, ZI. After around 1.5 sec, AR attempted however tripped on reclose. Fault cleared within 71 msec from Khupi end on operation of DP, ZI, AR attempted after 1 sec, however tripped during reclaim time. At 13:38:18.187 Hrs, Kameng ICT tripped on E/F Stg-II within 70 msec.

It has been observed that HV side E/F operation of Kameng ICT seems to be correct as per the setting of 200*8 =1600 A with time delay of 50 msecs. However, high current value of around 2.5-2.9 kA observed in 400 kV Star connected end of Kameng ICT.

The event discussed during the GD discussion online meeting held on 12th June 2026 as follows:

The 400/132 kV ICT is an autotransformer having common neutral for the 400 kV and 132 kV windings. During an earth fault in the 132 kV system, neutral current may return through the common neutral of the ICT. Accordingly, where the E/F protection derives current input from the neutral bushing CT (ratio: 200/1 A), the relay may record the neutral current corresponding to the 132 kV-side earth faults. Hence, the forum suggested NEEPCO to take the Backup OC & EF relay settings using the inputs from the Bay CT's at the HV side (CTR: 500/1) to avoid such unwanted EF Highset operation.

Hence, NEEPCO is requested to take necessary corrective measures on the above-mentioned issues to prevent further occurrences.

Deliberation (90th PCCM |23rd June 2026)

NEEPCO stated that the current for EF protection was taken from Neutral CT on the directions of the OEM. Forum suggested NEEPCO to take the Backup OC & EF relay settings using the inputs from the Bay CT's at the HV side (CTR: 500/1) to avoid such unwanted EF Highset operation. NEEPCO agreed to adhere to the changes and informed that it will be implemented within 20 days. Further he requested NERPC and NERLDC to provide pick up current settings for EF highset at the earliest. NERLDC assured that the settings will be communicated shortly.

Also, NEEPCO informed that the vendor of the P633 relay has been demerged into 2 different companies i.e., Schneider & GE Vernova and getting OEM support has become difficult. Also, he informed that the suggestion will be implemented after carrying out Simulation studies in consultation with the OEM.

NEEPCO to update

Deliberation

NEEPCO updated that the recommended settings at the relays of Kameng ICT have been implemented on 03.08.2026. He added that as suggested by PCC forum, the neutral CT (200/1A) has been replaced with bay CTs having ratio of 500/1 A(HV) & 600/1A (LV) for ICT E/F protection.

Forum noted the above

C.5 Grid Disturbance in Mendipathar area of Meghalaya Power System on 4th June'2026:

(Ref: Agenda B.19 | 90th PCCM |23rd June 2026)

Mendipathar area of Meghalaya power system was connected with rest of the grid through 132 kV mendipathar-Nangalbibra & 132 kV Agia-Nangalbibra lines.

At 02:12 hrs of 04-06-2026, 132 kV 132 kV Agia-Mendipathar, 132 kV Mendipathar-Nangalbibra & 132 kV Agia-Nangalbibra Lines tripped leading to grid disturbance in Mendipathar area of Meghalaya power system. Load loss of 16 MW occurred.



As per DR analysis, Solid R-N fault (Ir-1.2 kA, In-1.4 kA) appears to be in 132 kV Agia Nangalbibra line at a distance of 2.44 Km from Nangalbibra which was cleared from Nangalbibra end (CB2) on ZI within 54 msec. ZII operated at Agia end (CB1). There was a subsequent fault in 132 kV Nangalbibra-Mendipathar line which tripped on ZI at Nangalbibra end (CB6) with a fault distance of 2.75 Km. ZII/ZIII started at Mendipathar end (CB5), however, prior to clearing of fault from Mendipathar end (CB5), 132 kV Agia-Mendipathar line tripped on operation of Earth fault from Agia end (CB3) within 578 msec.

Root cause: Tripping occurred due to multiple lightning faults near Nangalbibra.

Action points for MePTCL:

- Backup E/F setting at Agia for 132 kV Mendipathar line (CB3) needs to be reviewed and coordinated with ZIII time delay as per NERPC Protection philosophy.
- ZII time delay at Mendipathar (CB5) for 132 kV Nangalbibra line needs to be reviewed and set as per protection philosophy.

Deliberation (90th PCCM | 23rd June 2026)

Forum directed MePTCL to undertake the following action points –

- Backup E/F setting at Agia for 132 kV Mendipathar line (CB3) to be reviewed and coordinated with ZIII time delay as per NERPC Protection philosophy.
- ZII time delay at Mendipathar (CB5) for 132 kV Nangalbibra line needs to be reviewed and set as per protection philosophy.

- Relay at Mendipathar for Nangalbibra line to be tested.
- MePTCL to provide the ZII settings and EF settings, as mentioned above, to NERPC and NERLDC at the earliest.

MePTCL to update

Deliberation

MePTCL updated that the ZII settings at Mendipathar have been modified and new settings have been sent to NERPC and NERLDC.

Forum noted the above

C.6 Grid disturbance in Pasighat area of Arunachal Pradesh on 3rd June'2026:

(Ref: Agenda B.20|90th PCCM |23rd June 2026)

Pasighat, Napit and Niglok areas of AP Power System were connected with rest of NER Grid through 132 kV Along-Pasighat and 132 kV Roing-Pasighat lines.

At 01:42 Hrs on 03-06-2026, 132 kV Along-Pasighat and 132 kV Roing-Pasighat lines tripped. Due to tripping of these elements, Pasighat, Napit and Niglok areas of AP Power System were isolated from NER Grid and collapsed due to no source available in this area. Load loss of 8 MW occurred.



A three-phase-to-ground fault (R-Y-B-N) appears to have occurred in the system connected at Pasighat. The fault initially persisted as a multi-phase fault for approximately 170 msecs, after which it evolved into a predominantly R-phase-to-ground fault.

Fault was in 132 kV Pasighat-Napit lines which was cleared by Line-2 from both ends on Zone-1 operation. However, the fault was not cleared immediately from Pasighat end of line-1 due to which fault was feeding from 132 kV Along-Pasighat & 132 kV Roing-Pasighat lines. Consequently, 132 kV Along-Pasighat & 132 kV Roing-Pasighat lines tripped on ZII from Along & Roing end.

Action points for DoP Arunachal Pradesh:

- Delayed clearance of fault through 132 kV Pasighat-Napit Ckt-1 from Pasighat end was observed. Distance protection settings and scheme for 132 kV Pasighat-Napit I line needs to be reviewed.

- DR time drift needs to be rectified at Pasighat:

  Time drift of **7 min** at Pasighat end of 132 kV Pasighat-Napit Ckt-1 line

  Time drift of **9 min** at Pasighat end of 132 kV Pasighat-Napit Ckt-2 line

Deliberation (90th PCCM |23rd June 2026)

Forum directed DoP Ar. Pradesh to check the distance protection settings at Pasighat end for the Napit ckt 1 and rectify the issue in coordination with NERPC and NERLDC. Further DoP Ar. Pradesh was instructed to rectify the DR time drift issue at Pasighat at the earliest.

DoP Ar. Pradesh to update

Deliberation

DoP AR. Pradesh updated that they will schedule testing of the Napit ckt 1 relay, at Pasighat, shortly.

Forum noted the above

Action: DoP Ar. Pradesh

C.7 Non-operation of Autorecloser in 400 kV NETC owned lines during May & June'26:

(Ref: Agenda B.21|90th PCCM |23rd June 2026)

The list of the tripping events is tabulated below: -

Sl. No.	Name of Line Element	Tripping Date & Time	Revival Date & Time	Relay Indication		Remarks
				End A	End B	
1	400 kV Silchar-Palatana T/L (Ckt-II)	24-05-2026 04:32	24-05-2026 05:01	Silchar End: AFAS:M1: R-N, 60.762KM, 4.40KA, Zone-1 M2: R-N,60.979 KM, 4.35KA, Zone-1	Palatana End: DP, ZI, R-E, 180.2 KM, 1.436KA, 50 msecs	A/R Successful at Silchar end but AR not attempted at Palatana end.
2	400 kV Silchar-Palatana T/L (Ckt-II)	03-06-2026 05:06	03-06-2026 05:46	Silchar End: AFAS:M1: R-,40.99KM, 7.22KA, Zone-1 M2: R-N,41.463 KM,7.4 KA, Zone-1	Palatana End: R-N, 205 KM, Zone-2, Carrier aided Tripping, 84 msecs	A/R Successful at Silchar end but AR not attempted at Palatana end.
3	400 kV Silchar-Byrnihat T/L (Ckt-II)	24-05-2026 01:13	24-05-2026 04:14	Silchar End: AFAS:M1: B-N,18.696KM, 8.64KA, Zone-1 M2: B-N,18.886 KM,8.52KA, Zone-1; DT Received	Byrnihat End: DP, ZII, B-E, FD: 249.9 KM,1.8 kA Carrier aided Tripping, 86 msecs; DT Send	A/R Successful at Silchar end but tripped on DT received but AR not attempted at

						Byrnihat end.

The nonoperation of Autorecloser in the above-mentioned lines are critical for the NER grid.

Hence, utilities are requested to take corrective action & as well ensure the healthiness of the at the lines.

Deliberation (90th PCCM |23rd June 2026):

1. For issue with the 400 kV Silchar-Palatana II line, OTPC stated that there is some issue with the PLCC link because of which AR was blocked. He requested Powergrid to visit Palatana and help resolve the issue. Forum urged Powergrid to extend necessary assistance in this regard.
2. For 400 kV Silchar-Byrnihat line, forum directed MePTCL to look into the issue and revert through mail.

Concerned utilities to update

Deliberation

1. For issue with the 400 kV Silchar-Palatana II line, OTPC stated that both the PLCC channels were faulty. Powergrid assured to look into the matter shortly.
2. For 400kV Silchar-Byrnihat II line, MePTCL updated that the system event occurred on the 24.05.2026, 01:13 hours. During this event, the Zone 2 (Z2) protection element operated on Main 2 of the 400 KV Byrnihat–Silchar transmission line. Furthermore, upon checking the PSL of P444, main 2 relay PSL, it was found that the Z2 operation has been logically linked to Direct Trip send. MePTCL added that the PSL configuration has remained unaltered since the initial commissioning of the transmission line. Forum directed MePTCL to disable the DT sent logic at Byrnihat during the Zone initiation of 400 KV Byrnihat–Silchar.

Forum noted the above

Action: all concerned utilities

C.8 Mapping of SPS in the SCADA Display for real time monitoring of all SPS:

(Ref: Agenda C.1 89th PCCM |21st April 2026)

NLDC has submitted the Guidelines on "Interfacing Requirements" after stakeholder consultation for approval of the Commission as mentioned in the Regulation 7.4, read with Regulation 14.2 of the Communication System for inter-State transmission of electricity) Regulations,2017. On dated 19-Jan-2024, CERC approved the guideline on "Interfacing Requirements" prepared by NLDC in consultation with the stakeholder. As per the Guideline, real time telemetered is SPS Signal need to be monitored. The digital status shall be as per IEC standard. Digital Status for circuit breaker must be double point while isolator status can be either single point or double point as per end device. All users shall comply with interface requirements as specified and shall share interface details with respective Control Centre.

Sl. No.	Description	Analog Points	Digital Points	Protection Signal
1	SPS Signal		DIGITAL STATUS: Enable/Disable, Operated/No Operated (Condition/Logic Wise)	

Present Status of SPS mapping in SCADA Display

10-Apr-2026 17:54:24 SPS STATUS &

STATION	SPS	SPS ON/OFF	SPS OPTD.
BGTPP_NTPC	BGTPP U-3	ON	NRML
PALATANA_OTPC	SPS-2 Bangladesh	ON	NRML
	SPS-4 Bangladesh	ON	NRML
	SPS -2 HSR	OFF	NRML
	SPS -3 HSR	OFF	NRML
ZIRO_PG	ZIRO SPS	OFF	NRML
SARUSAJAI_AS	SARUSAJAI SPS	F OFF	F NRML
IMPHAL_PG	IMPHAL SPS	OFF	NRML
SM NAGAR (ST)	SM NAGAR B/R -1 SPS	ON	NRML
SM NAGAR (ST)	SM NAGAR B/R -2 SPS	ON	NRML
PK BARI (ST)	PK BARI B/R -1 SPS	ON	NRML
PK BARI (ST)	PK BARI B/R -2 SPS	ON	NRML
TINSUKIA (AS)	TINSUKIA SPS	OFF	NRML
BONGA_AS	SPS Stage -1	ON	NRML
	SPS Stage -2		NRML
MONARCHAK	MONARCHAK	ON	NRML
KHLEIHRIAT	KHLEIHRIAT SPS	ON	NRML
LESKA	LESKA SPS	ON	NRML
SM NAGAR (TE)	SM NAGAR LOAD SPS	ON	NRML

NER

Sl. No.	SPS under operation	SPS mapping status in SCADA (YES/No)
1	SPS related to outage of 220 Misa-Samaguri D/C lines	NO Mapping will be done shortly by last Week of March 2026
2	Related to outage of any one circuit of 220 kV Balipara-Sonabil D/C lines	NO Mapping will be done shortly by last Week of March 2026
3	Outage of 220 kV BTPS (Salakati) – Rangia I & II Line	NO Mapped till SLDC. SLDC to coordinate with NERLDC
4	SPS at Azara for Preventing Overloading of 400/220 kV, 2×315 MVA ICTs at Azara	NO

5	SPS related to overloading of any one of the 400/132kV, 2x360 MVA ICTs at Panyor Lower Hydro Power Station	NO
6	Outage/tripping of any one circuit of 132 kV Dimapur(PG)- Dimapur(NA) D/C Line	NO
7	SPS related to generation evacuation from Loktak HEP	NO As per NHPC, SCADA system is not available at Loktak. Mapping of SPS at Loktak HEP will take time & it will be completed after renovation work at Loktak plant.

It is to be noted that the SPS logic at Sonabil has recently been updated by AEGCL during 9th & 10th June 2026. In view of the criticality of SPS operation and system security, it is essential that all SPS-related status and trigger signals are made available at SLDC and NERLDC for continuous real-time monitoring and situational awareness.

Deliberation (90th PCCM |23rd June 2026):

As informed by AEGCL, mapping will be completed by July'26 for Sl no -1,2,3 and 4 respectively.

AEGCL to update

Deliberation

AEGCL updated that the mapping is yet to be done. Forum directed AEGCL to complete the SPS SCADA mapping at the earliest.

Forum noted the above

Action: AEGCL

C.9 Grid Disturbance at Kohima & radially connected areas Pfutsero, Meluri, Zhadima, Chiephobozou areas & LHEP generating station of Nagaland:

(Ref: Agenda B.12| 89th PCCM |21st April 2026)

Deliberation in 89th PCC meeting:

Event 1:

NERLDC apprised that in the DR of Kohima end it has been observed that there was intermittent pickup of ZII at Kohima end for instances of 310 msecs & 150 msecs by the Main relay of 132 kV Dimapur – Kohima line resulted into failure of timely operation of ZII at the Kohima end and hence ZII operation at Karong.

Forum instructed DoP Nagaland to –

1. Test the Main relay at Kohima for the 132 kV Dimapur – Kohima line.
2. Transplay the DR output for the tripping in the main relay to check the performance.

Event 2:

DoP Nagaland informed that the reason for no operation of protection system at Kohima end is being looked into. NERLDC apprised that the ZIV initiation at Kohima for Karong bay raises concern that the actual fault location must be somewhere near the Kohima SS.

Forum instructed DoP Nagaland to –

1. Ensure timely submission of DR and EL so that thorough analysis of GDs may be done
2. Find out the location of fault and investigate into non-operation of protection system at Kohima and provide report to NERPC at the earliest.

Forum also instructed Manipur to look into the issue of operation of ZII in 73 msec, which is not in compliance with the standard time delay of 350-500 msec.

Deliberation

DoP Nagaland requested PowerGrid to visit the Kohima SS and test the relay. Forum urged Powergrid to extend necessary help, and Powergrid agreed to that.

Forum noted the above

Action: Powergrid and DoP Nagaland

C.10 Repeated tripping of 220 kV Misa-Kopili 2 & 3 Lines:

(Ref: Agenda 2.2| 238th OCCM |15th May 2026)

Deliberation in 238th OCC:

NEEPCO apprised the forum that there may be issues related to the BCU associated with the Kopili–Misa-2 and Kopili–Misa-3 lines. NEEPCO informed that the matter has already been taken up with M/s GE Vernova and representatives from the OEM are expected to visit by the last week of the month for detailed examination of the

issue. NEEPCO further informed that, based on the observations during the visit, the status and further course of action would be intimated to NERPC and NERLDC.

MS, NERPC directed that the matter may also be deliberated in detail during the upcoming PCC meeting of NERPC for further review and necessary action.

Action: NEEPCO to coordinate with M/s GE Vernova for detailed examination of the BCU issues associated with Kopili–Misa-2 and Kopili–Misa-3 lines and update NERPC and NERLDC. The matter shall also be deliberated in the upcoming PCC meeting of NERPC.

Deliberation in 90th PCCM |23rd June 2026 (Agenda C.7):

NEEPCO informed that OEM will visit the site by July'26 end /Aug'26 first week

NEEPCO to update

Deliberation

NEEPCO informed the Forum that the issue has been attended to and rectified by the OEM of the BCU, representative from GE. Subsequently, the lines were tested from 20.07.2026 to 24.07.2026.

Forum noted the above

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Annexure-I

List of Participants in the 91st PCC Meeting held on 20.08.2026

SN	Name & Designation	Organization
1	Sh. Moli Kamki EE (E)	Ar. Pradesh
2	Sh. Daggum Doji, AE (E)	Ar. Pradesh
3	Sh. Ajay Kumar Ladha, Dy.Mgr, AEGCL	Assam
4	Sh. Kaustavjit Kalita, Dy.Mgr, AEGCL	Assam
5	Smti. Khoisnam Steela, DGM (TD-III), MSPCL	Manipur
6	Sh. Khumujam Deepak, Mgr (SSD-II),MSPCL	Manipur
7	Sh. C.Chawngzikpuia, SDO	Mizoram
8	Sh. K.Kynjing, AEE, MePTCL	Meghalaya
9	Sh. Alvin Shullai, AEE, MePGCL	Meghalaya
10	Sh. Pulovi Sumi, SDO	Nagaland
11	Sh. Namheu Khate, EE (T)	Nagaland
12	Sh. Alex E.Ngullie, JE	Nagaland
13	Sh. Santanu Das, DGM, TPTL	Tripura
14	Sh. Somara Lakra, CGM I/c	NERLDC
15	Sh. Neeraj Kumar, CGM	NERLDC
16	Sh. Anjan Kumar Pandey, Dy.Mgr	NERLDC
17	Sh. Utpal Das, Dy.Mgr	NERLDC
18	Sh. Bastov Saikia, Asst.Mgr	NERLDC
19	Sh. Manash Jyoti Baishya, Ch.Mgr	PGCIL
20	Sh. Suman Das, DGM	NEEPCO
21	Sh. Sanjib Pal, Section Head-PME	OTPC
22	Sh. Sudip Chanda, PSS Engineer	PRDC
23	Sh. B.Lyngkhoi, Member Secretary	NERPC
24	Sh. Veerandranath Muncha, Director	NERPC
25	Sh. Lenin B., Dy.Director	NERPC
26	Sh. Vikash Shankar, Asst. Director	NERPC